Dictators at War and Peace (Cornell Studies in Security Affairs)

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Dictators at War and Peace (Cornell Studies in Security Affairs)

Dictators at War and Peace (Cornell Studies in Security Affairs)

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It is a bit puzzling, thus, to see the directed-dyad-year as the unit of analysis in Chapter 2, the quantitative chapter. Because they are competing for power, both civilian and military officials are reluctant to share information with each other, which in turn makes it difficult to coordinate strategic plans with political goals. second, actors form perceptions of the costs of fighting, regardless of the outcome of the conflict. Using novel cross-national data, Weeks looks at various nondemocratic regimes, including those of Saddam Hussein and Joseph Stalin; the Argentine junta at the time of the Falklands War, the military government in Japan before and during World War II, and the North Vietnamese communist regime. All told, then, even if the Junta’s strategy was risky, it was not unreasonable to believe that when confronted with a bloodless fait accompli the British government would simply walk away, while any attempts at a diplomatic resolution would likely be frustrated by the British government’s refusal to force a transfer on the reluctant islanders.

In an argument more specific to non-democracies, Jessica Weiss maintains that authoritarian regimes can signal resolve by tolerating anti-foreign protests, which are costly to suppress and may spin out of control and potentially threaten regime survival. The new Prime Minister in 1937, Fumimaro Konoe, was not a military officer, there was no coup or seizure of power by the military, and the structure of the regime remained unchanged.

Since there are no counterfactuals in the case studies to evaluate the explanatory power of the regime typology, there is no way to assess the underlying factors that drive the behavior of the different regimes. The reason is that an enormous literature suggests that the strongest predictors of international conflict are dyadic in nature. If the peacetime threat of domestic punishment is high, the use of force with the potential for political domestic rewards in the case of victory can be a rational gamble, even if defeat carries a high concomitant likelihood of punishment. To examine war outcome, she extends her dataset back through the interwar period, again finding that Machines are comparable to democracies in their success in war, that Juntas are slightly less successful, and that personalists are particularly unsuccessful.

Since the four factors mentioned earlier neatly organize themselves into four regime types, it is not really possible to evaluate which factors drive decisions for conflict. Regimes in which leaders are vulnerable to removal fall into two types depending on whether both actors are civilians ( machines) or military officers ( juntas). Moreover, retaking the islands posed a major military challenge, requiring the British to carry out amphibious landings thousands of miles from home with no local base from which to operate. Although this approach is common in the literature, [30] it puts a lot of weight on un-modeled common shocks that would push a regime type over the edge into conflict initiation and ignores the potential that a different regime type might not have experienced such a shock in the first place.This is because leaders of juntas must follow the wishes of their domestic audiences or face sanctions such as removal. He argues that I do not engage enough with an alternative diversionary explanation for the war, namely that that General Galtieri had reason to fear severe punishment (such as death, imprisonment, or exile) if he lost office, which he expected would come at the hands of naval minister Jorge Anaya if he did not make progress on the Falklands. Downes then points to Imperial Japan and Wilhemine Germany as examples of regimes that he thinks should be considered machines according to my typology, but which behave more like juntas because civilian elites shared power with, and often could not control, the military.

Project MUSE promotes the creation and dissemination of essential humanities and social science resources through collaboration with libraries, publishers, and scholars worldwide.While I did not single out Anaya as uniquely threatening to Galtieri, my argument is that part of what drove Galtieri to war were his concerns about the preferences of his audience, including Anaya. More importantly, the argument that the invasion was clearly going to be a diplomatic disaster but that the Junta’s predisposition toward military solutions led it to miss this obvious fact (114-115) neglects what were in fact quite rational bases for the Junta to have been both pessimistic about the utility of diplomacy and optimistic about the use of force. Moreover, I did not find evidence that Galtieri gambled on an invasion of the Falklands despite believing to be hopeless endeavor – in fact, in his review, Alex Weisiger argues that the junta had reason to expect exactly the opposite. Despite this though, I would have loved to have seen the quite placid personalist boss rule regimes of Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan included, even if only to dismiss them as being too under Russia's wing to have much autonomy. In short, I argue that there are two types of civilian-led authoritarian regimes with audiences that vary depending on whether civilians control the military.

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